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SUMMARY
The Farm Service Agency (FSA) guaranteed loan programs are an important source of credit to production agriculture. The two major guaranteed loan
programs are the operating loan (OL) program and the farm ownership (FO) loan
program. Guaranteed loans insure payment to the lender of up to 95% of the
losses in the event of borrower default. FSA has historically been involved in
lending to farm operators via direct loans, but emphasis has changed over the last
two decades to making guaranteed loans the primary source of FSA associated
lending to production agriculture. This study seeks to determine what characteristics of banks and the lending environment from 1990-1995 motivated Arkansas
banks to use guaranteed loans and how the level of participation is related to such
factors. In addition, factors are identified that indicate the likelihood of banks
paying loss claims. Regression methods are used to identify these factors and the
data base uses observations on individual Arkansas commercial banks for up to
six years.
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MODELS OF FSA GUARANTEED LOAN USE
VOLUME AND LOSS CLAIMS AMONG ARKANSAS
COMMERCIAL BANKS
Bruce L. Dixon, Bruce L. Ahrendsen, and Scott M. McCollum
INTRODUCTION
Commercial banks, the Farm Credit System (FCS), the Farm Service Agency (FSA)1
and life insurance companies are the major institutional providers of credit to production agriculture. Commercial banks, referred to simply as banks hereafter, are a major
participant with 41% of the farm debt market (USDA/ERS, 1999) among the four major types of financial institutions providing credit to agriculture and are the focus of
this study. Many rural banks specialize in agricultural lending, and they usually dominate the rural deposit and loan demand base for their area. A bank is typically classified
as an “agricultural bank” when its percentage of agricultural loans to total loans is
greater than 17% (Ahrendsen et al., 1994). Other institutions such as savings and loans,
FCS, merchants, dealers, and life insurance companies also provide credit to agricultural markets.
The agricultural lending environment has changed over time. Following the financial crisis of the 1980s, financial intermediaries became cautious about lending to agriculture and revised their loan portfolios to match this new attitude (Boehlje and Pederson,
1988). In Arkansas during the same period, from 1987 through 1992, a declining base
of farmers (Bureau of the Census), caused the competition for the agricultural loan
market to increase among banks and other lenders to agriculture.
Also in the 1980s, the federal government implemented policy changes that restricted the flow of funds to the FSA (USDA, form 389-175). FSA provides credit to
farmers who cannot obtain credit from private lenders at reasonable terms and rates of
interest and monitors the progress of the borrower-lender relationship. Historically,
FSA was very active in directly lending funds to financially-strapped farmers. Beginning in the mid-1980s, however, FSA policy gradually switched to emphasizing the
loan guarantee portion of its portfolio in order to aid farmers as before but with less
direct funds and other resources from the FSA. An FSA loan guarantee insures the
lending institution for up to 95% of the current principal of a defaulted loan.

1

FSA is the agency formed from the consolidation of The Farmers Home Administration (FmHA) and the
Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Service. For clarity, this agency is referred to as FSA throughout the remainder of the study even when referring to the FmHA in pre-consolidation years.
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Loan guarantees went from 35.9% of total FSA obligations in fiscal 1986 to a high
of 77.5% of total FSA obligations in 1995 and then to 66% in 1998 (USDA/ERS,
1999). In terms of total dollars obligated, fiscal 1986 had $2.808 billion in direct loans
and $1.569 billion in guaranteed loans. In contrast, fiscal 1998 had $745 million in
direct obligations $1.435 billion in guarantees (USDA/ERS, 1999). The loan guarantee
program makes it easier for private financial institutions to lend to marginal borrowers.
In this way, borrowers can obtain credit through private lenders at market interest rate
levels. The loan guarantee program allows the bank to keep the loan in its portfolio
since the same loan without the guarantee may be deemed as being too risky.
The FSA’s increased emphasis on loan guarantees has probably encouraged banks
to lend to the agricultural sector. Where previously a bank would not lend to a farmer
if the farmer did not meet the bank’s criteria specified in its loan policy, a bank could
now lend because the loan is backed by the federal government. However, it remains
an empirical question - and the subject of this study - as to what factors motivate a
given bank to use or not use the guaranteed loan program.
The use of the guaranteed loan program allows banks (and other lenders such as
the FCS) to access these higher risk markets consisting of beginning farmers who have
no credit history, borrowers who have a poor credit history, and borrowers who do not
have a large enough collateral base to support the credit requested. This allows banks
to make loans to a large variety of borrowers. Commercial banks can increase their
loan portfolio size with the same loanable funds base due to the different regulations
imposed on guaranteed loans because only the unguaranteed portion of a loan counts
against a bank’s legal lending limit. For example, guaranteed loans have a higher maximum loan-to-collateral ratio than non-guaranteed loans.
Study Objectives
This study seeks to identify characteristics of banks and/or economic forces that
influence commercial banks’ level of FSA loan guarantee programs within Arkansas.
Factors influencing the volume of loan guarantees over time and their impact are identified. This study also identifies factors affecting the volume of loss claims on FSA
guaranteed operating loans by commercial banks who have used FSA loan guarantees.
Factors such as geographic location of bank, loan-to-asset ratio, bank’s percentage of
loans in agriculture, affiliation with a bank holding company, factors associated with
the loan performance of the bank (e.g., agricultural loan losses to total agricultural
loans), and size of bank are among those variables hypothesized to be important. This
study estimates how these factors influence a bank’s decision to use loan guarantees
and how they affect a bank’s volume of FSA loss claims.
The 1996 Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act (FAIR) has placed
added emphasis on the FSA loan guarantee program. With the reduction and elimination of target prices, loan guarantees remain one of the last government policy tools to
directly aid farmers. Currently, little is known about which factors motivate a bank to
use the FSA loan guarantee program. If more knowledge can be gained about these
factors, it should be possible to improve program effectiveness. Such knowledge is
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also useful in indicating how the volume of guarantees will change as economic conditions change, e.g., a downturn in the overall agricultural economy.
The analysis in this study provides lending institutions, depository and non-depository alike, with information assisting them in marketing decisions, forecasting loan
demand, and analyzing for expansion and growth opportunities into new or existing
locations. The implications of the model are also useful to farm operators to help them
understand the factors affecting general FSA loan availability and identify those banks
most likely to use FSA loan guarantees.
Overview of Study
Within the Arkansas farm debt market, FSA increased the dollar volume of guaranteed loans obligated throughout most of the 1980s before declining slightly in the
early 1990s.2 Beginning in 1985, FSA increased the emphasis and usage of the loan
guarantee program, which accounted for most of the increase in loan guarantee volume
during the mid-1980s. As displayed in Table 1, there was very little guaranteed loan
activity in the early 1980s. In 1985, a distinct policy change at FSA emphasized guaranteed loans. FSA total guaranteed loan volume reached a peak in 1991 of $54 million
followed by another low point in 1993 of $34 million and turned up again through 1996
to $75 million. In 1988, FSA guaranteed 435 loan originations, an increase of 12% over
the previous year’s number of originations and an increase of 167% over originations
in 1986. After 1988, the number of FSA guaranteed loan originations generally declined through 1993. In 1993, FSA guaranteed 221 loans, a decrease of 34% from the
previous year’s originations and a decrease of 49% from the 1988 peak. Originations
increased from 1994 through 1996, with 456 originations in 1996, an increase of 106%
over 1993 in which there were 221 originations.
Two categories of loans are analyzed in this study, operating loans (OL) and farm
ownership (FO) loans. Operating loans are generally for a year but may be longer while
the FO loans are long-term. As displayed in Fig. 1, which graphs the guaranteed loan
originations in Table 1, OL guaranteed obligations increased through 1988, and stabilized through 1991 before falling off in 1992 and 1993. Then the trend reversed with
increases in 1994, 1995, and 1996. In 1997, there were decreases in both numbers of
loans and dollar volume followed by a 10% dollar volume increase from 1997 to 1998.
Farm ownership guaranteed obligation dollar volume increased steadily throughout
1981 to 1991, where they obtained a high, followed by a decline in the following two
years and then increased steadily after 1993 to an all-time high in 1997 but then dropping 28% from 1997 to 1998.
Crop reporting districts3 (CRD) 3 and 6 experienced the highest commercial bank
OL guarantee activity in both number of obligations and dollar volume for 1990-1995
as indicated in Table 2.4 These two CRDs accounted for 72% of total numbers of
2

The dollar volume data for FSA obligations are for fiscal years ending September 30, not calendar years.
A map showing the counties in each crop reporting district is given in Appendix A.
4
The data in Tables 1 and 2, when appropriately summed for the years 1990-1995, should give identical
results. They do not agree and this is due to the fact that they are taken from different FSA data bases that
have not been reconciled.
3
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obligations and 80% of total volume of FSA OL guarantees over the six years 19901995. In addition, these two CRDs plus CRD 9 had the highest average OL guarantee
size. CRD 6 accounted for 46% of all FSA OL loan guarantees over the six years and
26% of the farm ownership dollar volume. CRDs 2, 3, and 8 had the highest average
dollar volume across the state for FSA farm ownership loan guarantees.
It should be pointed out that FSA guaranteed loans are not a major proportion of
total agricultural credit in Arkansas. Most agricultural borrowers are sufficiently credit
worthy so guarantees are unnecessary, since guaranteed loans cost 1% of the amount
obligated and are avoided when possible. To put this in better perspective, in 1995
Arkansas had slightly more than $3.6 billion in total farm debt (U.S. Department of
Commerce), but only about $52 million worth of loans (Table 1) were obligated via OL
and FO guaranteed obligations of total debt.
THE FSA GUARANTEED LOAN PROGRAM
The FSA lending program began in 1935 and the administering agency has had
many names including the Resettlement Administration in 1935, the Farm Security
Administration in 1937, and the Farmers Home Administration (FmHA) in 1946. Its
original function was to make loans and grants to depression-stricken families and help
them regain self-sufficiency in making a living on family farms. Legislation was passed
merging the farm programs section of the FmHA with the Agricultural Stabilization
and Conservation Service and Federal Crop Insurance Corporation to form FSA effective 1 October 1995. The former farm program section of FmHA was then changed to
the Agricultural Credit Department of FSA.
Until the early 1970s, FSA provided credit to farmers directly through government
funded (direct) loans. The Rural Development Act of 1972 authorized FSA to guarantee loans made by commercial lenders. In guaranteeing farm loans, FSA agrees to reimburse the private lender for up to 95% of lost principal if the borrower defaults
(USDA/ERS, 1996).5
In 1984, FSA began emphasizing guaranteed farm loans to help keep lending in
the private sector, reduce budget outlays, and provide better service from a deteriorating direct loan program (USDA/FmHA, 1989). The Food Security Act of 1985 and
subsequent legislation has further supported the FSA shift to guaranteed farm lending
by allocating more of FSA’s appropriations to the guaranteed loan program.
The borrowers’ financial condition criteria for a guaranteed loan are normally
slightly stronger than FSA’s direct loan program eligibility criteria, which stipulate that
borrowers must not be able to obtain private financing at reasonable rates and terms.
Lenders may sell the guaranteed portion of loans, in whole or in part, to secondary
market investors.
There are three primary guaranteed farm loan programs:

5

Prior to 1996, the maximum guarantee was 90% (USDA/FmHA Lender Manual, 1993). The 90% limit
continues to be in effect for many guaranteed loans.
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1. Farm operating (OL) loans enable family farmers to obtain short-and intermediate-term financing. Two types of OL guarantees are available depending on the
intended use of funds. These include the loan note guarantee (term loan) and
the contract of guarantee (line of credit). Loan note guarantees cover loans needed
to 1) purchase items such as equipment, livestock, and poultry; 2) pay annual
operating and/or family living expenses; 3) refinance debts; and 4) pay other
creditors. Line of credit guarantees allow borrowers to obtain loan funds, as
needed, up to a predetermined amount for annual operating purposes.
2. Farm ownership (FO) loans enable farmers who lack other credit sources to
improve, refinance, or buy farm real estate. FO loan guarantees are loan note
guarantees (term loans).
3. Soil and water (SW) loans are used to encourage and facilitate the improvement, protection, and proper use of farmland and water resources. Soil and water
loans are loan note guarantees (term loans). SW loans have been a very minor
part of the loan guarantee activities in Arkansas compared with OL and FO
loans.
To obtain an FSA OL, FO, or SW loan guarantee, a private lending institution must
certify that it will not provide credit to or continue lending to a borrower without a loan
guarantee. Additionally, the lender must provide information showing that the borrower has income and security to ensure repayment of the loan or line of credit. The
interest rate on a guaranteed loan is negotiated between the lender and borrower. The
interest rate may be a fixed or variable rate agreed upon by the borrower and the lender.
The lender may not charge a rate that exceeds the rate the lender charges its average
customers.
The lending limit and maximum principal indebtedness for guaranteed OL loans is
$400,000 and $300,000 for guaranteed FO loans, so a farmer could have a total guaranteed loan indebtedness of $700,000. Additionally, when a borrower has or will have
FSA direct loans and guaranteed loans of the same type, the combined principal indebtedness cannot exceed the guaranteed limits for either of the two types of loans.6
In general, FSA requires that an eligible local lending institution act as the lender
who retains servicing responsibilities for any guaranteed loan. An eligible lender is
defined as “...any lending institution regulated by, and in good standing with, a state or
federal government body” (USDA/FmHA, Lender Manual, p. 2-2, 1993). As such,
federal or state chartered banks, Farm Credit Banks, Agricultural Credit Banks, Agricultural Credit Associations, Federal Land Credit Associations, Production Credit Associations, Banks for Cooperatives, savings and loan associations, building and loan
associations, mortgage companies that are a part of a bank holding company, and credit

6

The Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1998 raised the maximum
borrower indebtedness for guaranteed FO and OL loan programs to $700,000. The combined maximum
total indebtedness in both programs is still $700,000. The maximum indebtedness will be indexed beginning in 2000 (USDA/ERS, 1999).
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unions that are subject to credit examination and supervision by either a state or federal
agency would all qualify.
In addition to the eligible lender criterion above, FSA established the Approved
Lender Program (ALP) in 1984 to streamline the application process for making guaranteed loans. The objectives of the ALP program are to minimize time required for loan
approval, eliminate forms, and permit maximum use of forms normally used by the
lender, thereby reducing the workload responsibilities of the lender and FSA. Lenders
who meet the required criteria may be granted ALP status for a two-year period, at
which time they may reapply with the FSA state director (USDA/FmHA Agency Handbook, 1993).
The Agriculture Act of 1992 allowed FSA to establish the Certified Lender Program (CLP). The CLP was developed to take the place of the ALP program, but the
ALP has not been eliminated. The purpose of the CLP is to minimize the time required
for certified lenders to obtain responses for guaranteed loan approval, permit maximum use of forms normally used by the lender, and permit lenders to certify compliance rather than providing verifications.
The eligibility requirements for becoming a CLP lender are more stringent than an
ALP lender. The CLP lenders are high volume lenders with a higher degree of experience in guaranteed lending. Also, CLP lenders must have an acceptable guaranteed
loan loss rate in the past and must have serviced FSA guaranteed loans in the past.
Lenders with a proven record to process and service FSA guaranteed loans are given
greater flexibility. In February 1999, a Preferred Lender Program was approved with
minor differences from the CLP program (USDA/ERS, 1999).
METHODOLOGY
Types of Regression Models Estimated
This study attempts to explain the variation in volume of loan guarantees and loss
claims over time and among banks across Arkansas. Loan guarantee volume is a function of both the supply and demand for loans. A bank’s availability of funds and its
attitude towards allocating those funds among possible investments provides a supply
of loanable funds. A need for additional sources of capital other than leasing or using
equity for operating creates farmer demand for credit. Thus, the models specified have
both demand and supply variables to explain variation in FSA guaranteed loan volume.
Such models are reduced form models with loan volume activity as a function of both
supply and demand shifters as independent variables. Loss claims are a function of
bank characteristics, loan exposure, and the general farm economy.
In the model for explaining variation in the usage of loan guarantees and loss
claims, six equations are hypothesized. This six-equation model is composed of three
“double hurdle” submodels. The first submodel portrays the decision and activity level
of OL loans made, the second submodel explains the decision and activity level of FO
loans made, and the third submodel represents the level of loss claims for OL loans.7
7

As explained later in the data section, there were relatively few FO loss claims so the decision was made not
to estimate a loss claims model for FO loans.
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Each submodel contains a “selection” equation and “regression” equation. In the selection equation, the dependent variable is binary. In the case of the guaranteed loan
submodels, the binary variables indicate whether or not the bank made any guaranteed
loans in a given fiscal year. These models are estimated as probit equations. In the
regression equations of the guaranteed loan submodels, the levels of loans obligated
are regressed on appropriate independent variables. In the loss claims submodel, whether
or not the bank has any loss claims in a given fiscal year is determined by the selection
equation.8 This is a binary variable indicating whether or not the bank has incurred any
FSA loss claims on OL guaranteed loans in a given fiscal year. In the regression equation the level of OL loss-claims for a given year is modeled as a function of appropriate
independent variables in the regression equation.
Each of the two equation submodels is potentially characterized by incidental truncation. That is, the level of FSA loans made (or losses claimed) is only observed if a
decision is made by a bank to enter the FSA loan market. If the error term of the regression equation is correlated with the error term of the selection equation, incidental
truncation occurs (Greene, 1990) and estimation of the regression equation by least
squares yields inconsistent estimators. Essentially the estimators used for the selection
and regression equation are those described in Greene (1995) with an appropriate modification for heteroscedasticity as discussed later.
Variables Hypothesized to Affect FSA Loan Volume
In this section, the theorized relationships of independent variables to the dependent variables are given. All the variables used in the study are defined in Table 3.
Their construction is discussed in McCollum (1996). The dependent variables for the
OL submodel are OBL and OLOBL. The variable OBL equals one if the bank made
one or more OL loans in a year and OLOBL is the dollar loan volume made that year.
The dependent variables for the FO submodel are OBF and FOOBL and are defined
analogously to OBL and OLOBL, except for FO loans.
In a study of banker use of guaranteed loans by Keonig and Sullivan (1991), it was
found that among rural banks, those with a higher rate of returns on assets (ROA) were
more likely to have participated in the guaranteed loan program. This may occur because such banks find guaranteed loans enhance overall returns. A higher ROA could
also be a result of the bank selling the guaranteed portions of the loan into a secondary
market. This would leverage the bank’s investment for a higher ROA. Thus we hypothesize that use of guaranteed loans is more likely by firms with higher ROA since the
program helps reduce loan risk.
The lender’s propensity to invest available funds in loans, as opposed to other
investments, is measured by the loan-to-asset ratio (LAR) of a bank. An aggressive
loan policy increases LAR while simultaneously expanding the bank’s exposure to

8

The probit model for loss claims only uses observations from banks with some outstanding FSA guaranteed
loans. If a bank has no FSA guaranteed loans, it cannot make any loss claims, so the bank is not appropriate
for inclusion in the probit sample.
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loan losses. It is hypothesized that LAR is positively related to the bank’s usage of FSA
guaranteed loans.
An important variable in predicting variation in banks’ market share of agricultural loans in a study of Arkansas by Ahrendsen et al. (1994) is whether the bank is in
a county in a metropolitan statistical area (MSA) as defined by the U.S. Office of
Management and Budget. Eleven of the 75 counties in Arkansas are in MSAs. The
variable MSA is a binary variable taking on the value of one if a bank is located in an
MSA county and zero otherwise. The ratio of farming population to the non-farming
population is usually higher in rural counties. Also, the ratio of farm income to nonfarm income is usually higher. Both of these factors imply that the demand for agricultural loans is likely to be lower in urban areas than in rural areas. Therefore, MSA is
hypothesized to have a negative relationship with the number and volume of FSA guaranteed obligations.
A bank’s competitive position vis-à-vis other banks in a given market determines
how actively a bank seeks out borrowers, and how aggressive a bank’s lending activities must be in order to increase loan volume for a given demand. The level of competition is reflected by the variable market share (MS), which is calculated as the proportion of total bank deposits held by a bank in its county or MSA if the county is in an
MSA. A bank usually confines its activities to a 25- to 30-mile radius of its office, so
that it experiences its greatest competition from banks in close proximity (Rose, 1993).
If a bank has a high MS, it may also have a high share of the loans so it is not as
aggressive in making loans. Therefore, MS is expected to be negatively related to a
bank’s number and volume of FSA guaranteed loans originated.
The Herfindahl-Herschmann Index (HHI) is used as a means of measuring competition in a market. The HHI measures deposit concentration of the banks in a market.
HHI increases as deposit concentration in a market increases. HHI is hypothesized to
be negatively related to a bank’s volume of FSA guaranteed loans because the loans
allow banks in competitive markets (low HHI) to increase their loan portfolios.9
The ratio of outstanding agricultural loans to total loans (AGTL) reflects a bank’s
attitude towards lending to the agricultural sector and the conditions of the local economy.
As the ratio of agricultural loans to the total loan base of a bank increases, the attractiveness to that bank to use FSA loan guarantees is hypothesized to increase. Such
banks obtain a comparative advantage over other more commercially-oriented banks
because the agricultural bank is probably more knowledgeable and experienced in agricultural lending. These banks may also want to use loan guarantees to decrease risk
from loss of loan diversification. Also, as noted by LaDue and Hanson (1996), a low
AGTL probably implies a diverse local economy with banks less likely to lend to agriculture.
Banks experiencing losses on a particular investment-type larger than compared
with the rest of its asset portfolio would likely evaluate the wisdom of continuing to
9

Note a distinction between HHI and MS. The variable HHI is the same for all banks within the same bank
area (county or MSA) but MS varies by bank.
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allocate funds to that investment and seek ways to decrease the losses. RISK is the ratio
of total net agricultural loan losses to total outstanding agricultural loans divided by the
ratio of total net loan losses to total outstanding loans for a bank. The variable RISK
can also be viewed as a proxy for borrower credit worthiness, an important lending
consideration as noted by Miller and LaDue (1989); and Ellinger et al. (1992). The
relationship of RISK to the volume of FSA guaranteed loans is ambiguous. If higher
levels of risk cause curtailment of guaranteed loans, the sign is negative. However, if
rising RISK encourages more use, the sign is positive.
A bank affiliation with a multi-bank holding company (MBHC) implies the bank
has direct access to a correspondent bank(s). Such banks can diversify the risk of a
given loan. MBHC = 1 implies a bank is a member of a multi-bank holding company.
The access to correspondents argument implies an inverse relationship to the volume
of FSA guaranteed loans. Alternatively, a MBHC may have an economies of size advantage to give its banks specialized processing of guaranteed loans, so MBHC would
be positively related to FSA guaranteed loan use. Thus, it is not possible to sign the
direction of the relationship of MBHC to FSA guaranteed loan a priori.
Total bank assets (ASSET) are a measure of bank size. It is uncertain how this
variable influences guaranteed loan volume. Ellinger et al. (1990) observed that as a
bank’s size increases, there is an economies of size advantage over smaller banks in
using various marketing techniques. This indicates a positive relationship between
ASSET and use of FSA loan guarantees. Alternatively, as a bank’s assets increase, the
bank’s dependency on the marginal or substandard borrowers as customers for the
bank may decrease. Consequently, this would cause ASSET to have a negative relationship with FSA volume of guaranteed obligations.
Due to the financial hardships of the 1980s, many banks’ loan policies became
more conservative such as stricter collateral requirements on secured loans (Ellinger et
al., 1992). CVFARMV is the coefficient of variation of the value of farm land and
buildings in the county where a bank is located based on the four previous years.
CVFARMV is hypothesized to be positively related to FSA guaranteed obligation volume, since greater collateral variability could make loan guarantees more desirable.
The proportionate change in farm income from one year to the next by county
(∆FMINC) was found by Ahrendsen et al. (1994) to be positively related to bank market share of agricultural loans. Increased farm income can result in the demand for
agricultural loans to increase since farmers are better able to qualify for higher loan
amounts and may wish to expand current farm operations, creating a need for financing. Alternatively, increased income also permits self-financing, so ∆FMINC has no a
priori sign expectation. In addition, larger farm income variability increases the risk
associated with lending to the agricultural sector. Therefore, CVFMINC, the coefficient of variation over the previous four years in net farm income per county, is expected to be positively related to volume of FSA guaranteed obligations.
The ratio of revenues from the sales of field crops to total agricultural revenues by
county is denoted as FCREV. It is uncertain how FCREV is related to the volume of
FSA guaranteed loans. It is included to reflect the differences in loan demand by differ-
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ent types of agriculture in the state. Roughly, the eastern part of Arkansas is a crop
based agriculture and the western part is more reliant on animal agriculture.
An approved (ALP) or certified (CLP) lender program designation by FSA means
that the bank has met certain requirements stipulated by FSA. The bank must have
qualified personnel, an acceptable loss rate and/or have originated at least a minimum
amount of guaranteed loans. By being an ALP or CLP, the bank incurs lower transaction costs in making guaranteed loans. Banks with ALP and CLP designations may be
more inclined to use FSA loan guarantees in order to retain their ALP or CLP status.
Borrowers may also associate the ALP and CLP designation with a lender more likely
to use FSA loan guarantees. The binary variable PREF (preferred lender) has a value of
one if the bank has an ALP or CLP designation and zero otherwise. The coefficient is
expected to be positive.
As the interest rate charged on loans increases, it is more difficult for a borrower to
qualify for credit given his existing payment capacity. Increased loan payments lead to
financial failure as noted by Shephard and Collins (1982). To offset this risk, the lender
could obtain a guarantee on the loan to lower asset risk. Therefore, INT, the real interest rate which is computed as the discount rate plus 475 basis points10 less the inflation
rate, is expected to be positively related to the volume of FSA guaranteed loans.11
Factors Hypothesized to Affect Level of Loss Claims
Because few banks experienced loss claims, particularly for FO loans as discussed
shortly, observations on loss claims are only for OL loans. Thus, a bank is designated
as having a loss in a year (LS = 1) if it has one or more loss claims due to OL loans in
that year. LOSS is the sum of loss claims due to OL loan defaults paid to a bank in a
given fiscal year. The variables LS and LOSS are the dependent variables in the twoequation loss claims submodel.
The volume of FSA guaranteed OL loans held by a bank, FSAGOL, is hypothesized to be positively related to volume of FSA loss claims experienced by a bank, i.e.
a measure of its exposure to losses. The actual volume of current, outstanding guaranteed OL loans of a bank in a given year could not be obtained due to FSA record
keeping procedures. For this study, FSAGOL is computed as a moving, weighted average of volume of guaranteed OL obligations originated over the previous two years. A
review of that data available at the end of fiscal 1995 indicated that guaranteed OL
loans were paid back within a year or two of closing so that FSAGOL is computed as
90% of the prior years OL obligation and 20% of OL obligations lagged two years to
reflect this repayment pattern.
The level of guaranteed loss claims that a bank experiences likely increases with
the bank’s portfolio concentration in agricultural loans due to the likely aggressiveness
of the bank seeking agricultural loans. Therefore, AGTL is hypothesized to be posi-

10
11

One basis point is one one-hundredth of 1%.
The Arkansas usury law stipulates the interest rate on loans can be no more than the federal discount rate
plus 500 basis points. It is assumed the effective loan rate is near the usury ceiling, see Dixon et al., 1993.
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tively related to the incidence and volume of FSA loss claims. However, FSAGOL may
capture the level of exposure effect so that AGTL represents the expertise effect and
has a negative sign.
The ratio of outstanding loans to total assets (LAR) is hypothesized to be positively related to the incidence and volume of FSA loss claims because of the overall
level of risk implied by a high LAR. Banks with lower MS or HHI indices may seek
out marginal borrowers. Therefore, HHI and MS are expected to be negatively related
to the volume of FSA loss claims.
Variations in farm land values and farm income are measures of the level of risk
associated with agriculture. DeVuyst et al. (1995) hypothesized that land price volatility is an important explanatory variable for indicating the volume of loan losses. Therefore, CVFARMV and CVFMINC are both hypothesized to be positively related to the
number and volume of FSA loss claims. Conversely, as farm income increases, the
repayment capacity of the borrower increases. Therefore, ∆FMINC is hypothesized to
be negatively related to a bank’s number and volume of FSA loss claims. It is not clear
how the variation in types of farm enterprises within a county should affect loss claims
so it is not possible to sign FCREV.
A bank making risky agricultural loans will experience more loss claims. Therefore, RISK is hypothesized to be positively related to the volume of FSA loss claims.
An approved or certified lender designation by FSA means the bank must have an
acceptable loan loss rate on FSA guaranteed loans. Such banks have an incentive to
screen applicants closely. Thus, being a preferred lender (PREF), is hypothesized to be
negatively related to loss claim numbers and volume.
Losses experienced on loans may also be related to the age of those loans. As loans
mature the borrower likely has more to lose by a default. Therefore, AGEOL, the
weighted average age of the volume of outstanding FSA guaranteed loans of a bank,
would be negatively related to volume of FSA loss claims. It could also be argued that
borrowers with older loans could not graduate to regular, non-guaranteed loans so that
AGEOL should be positively signed. We suspect this effect is minor but will let the
data determine the sign. The variable AGEOL is a weighted average age of guaranteed
loans one or two years old weighted by the estimated volume of outstanding obligations for the particular year using the same estimates of outstanding OL volume as for
FSAGOL.
As the interest charged against borrowed money increases, the loan payment also
increases. This directly affects the cash flow of the borrower in paying off the loan and
meeting other expenses. Shepherd and Collins (1982) hypothesized in their study that
interest rates are positively related to the volume of loan losses experienced by a bank.
Therefore, INT is expected to be positively related to the volume of FSA loss claims a
bank experiences.
Losses experienced by a bank in previous years may be a good proxy for a bank’s
future losses. A bank experiencing heavy loan losses may have a loan policy that carries over into future years. Therefore, the sum of the previous five years of guaranteed
OL loss claims (OLLAG), is expected to be positively related to the volume of FSA
loss claims.
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Variable Construction and Data Sources
Variables are observed annually. All variables but MS and HHI are for the entire
year. MS and HHI are calculated based on June levels of deposits each year. The remaining variables except for CVFARMV, CVFMINC, ∆FMINC, and FCREV are computed using fiscal year observations since FSA obligation allotments are on a fiscal
year basis. Since CVFARMV, CVFMINC, ∆FMINC, FCREV are observed over calendar years, they are all lagged one year in the models. RISK is lagged one year to allow
adjustment time for changing risk conditions.Variables other than MS and HHI are
either sums for the fiscal year such as loan volume or averages of quarterly data such as
asset levels.
The data used in this study were obtained from several sources: the FSA State
office in Little Rock, Arkansas in cooperation with the federal FSA office in Washington, DC; Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) quarterly call reports of income and condition, and summary of deposits; U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau
of Economic Analysis (BEA); and the Bureau of the Census. Specific details are given
in McCollum (1996).
The sample data are a time-series of cross sections. The time period begins in
fiscal 1990 and ends in fiscal 1995. All financial variables used in estimating the regression models are deflated by the calendar year CPI-U (1982 to 1984 = 100, Council
of Economic Advisers) to give all financial figures in real terms. The sample for estimating the OL and FO submodels (OL and FO obligations) consists of 1423 observations over the six years. For the loss claims submodel, 490 observations, those with
FSAGOL > 0, are used since a bank cannot make a loss claim if it holds no guaranteed
loans.
Estimation Procedures
There are a large number of hypothesized independent variables in each of the
three submodels. As the econometric literature suggests, there are a large number of
ways that can be used in determining the exact list of variables to be included in a given
model. One approach is to estimate the models as initially specified and present the
results. This is the method that would be most appropriate for estimating a model where
there is a precise experimental design. Such an approach has the advantage of eliminating pre-test bias. However, such an approach results in lower statistical efficiency because many coefficients whose true values are zero are left unrestricted. That is, irrelevant independent variables remain in the regression model.
To capture the statistical efficiency from eliminating irrelevant regressors from the
model, the following approach was adopted. The models were initially estimated with
all hypothesized independent variables included as regressors. After estimation of these
models, any explanatory variables in the probit and regression equations that had calculated absolute values of z12 less than one were removed from the regression models
12

This is the ratio of the estimated coefficient to its estimated asymptotic standard error. It is the large sample
equivalent of the “t” ratio in the classical linear regression model.
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and the modified models were re-estimated. The criterion of dropping a variable if its z
value is less than one in absolute value comes from the rule for model specification by
maximizing adjusted R2. The application of this rule to the probit models has not been
established in the statistical literature as a specification device but is assumed here to
be a good compromise between deleting all variables not significant at the .05 or .01
level, or including all regressors regardless of significance.
Heteroscedasticity in the probit equations can result in inconsistent estimates.
Heteroscedasticity in a probit model means that the variance of the random error term
cannot be normalized to a value of one. This assumption is of fundamental importance
in estimating probit models. Unfortunately, there is not a broad set of tests in the literature for the existence of heteroscedasticity in probit models. As Greene (1990) discusses, the detection of heteroscedasticity in the probit model may indicate an omitted
variable. Because of this potential, ASSET is left in the two loan volume probit equations, and FSAGOL is left in the loss claim probit equation (regardless of the value of
their associated z’s), to guard against a possible misspecification. Our subjective evaluation is that ASSET (or FSAGOL in the loss claims model) is the most likely source of
heteroscedasticity in the probit models since the dependent variables of the probit models
could be viewed as functions of loan volumes.
Because the data set is panel in nature, the error terms of the regression equation in
the double hurdle model are possibly heteroscedastic as well as in the probit equation.
In fact, even if the regression equation without the inclusion of the inverse Mills ratio
(IMR) is homoscedastic13, inclusion of the IMR induces heteroscedasticity (Greene,
1990). Because of this, the covariance matrices of the regression equations’ parameters were estimated using White’s heteroscedasticity consistent covariance matrix.
Thus, the estimation procedure is to estimate the selection equation by probit and use
the parameters of the estimated probit equation to estimate the IMR. Then, the IMR is
included as a regressor in the regression equation and the regression coefficients are
estimated by OLS and their standard errors are computed using White’s heteroscedastic
consistent covariance matrix. It is assumed that the resulting z values of the individual
parameter estimates have an asymptotic, standard normal distribution.
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND ESTIMATED MODELS
Table 4 presents the number of banks that originated FSA guaranteed OL loans in
a given year across Arkansas from fiscal years, 1985 through 1995. Guaranteed loan
usage did not begin to increase noticeably until 1987 when 77 banks made originations
for OL loans. The numbers have been declining since that time with a slight peak in
1991 with 70 banks, or 28% of the total number of banks, originating guaranteed OL
loans and decreasing from that number in the early 1990s. The same is also true for the

13

The inverse Mills ratio is a crucial regressor in incidental truncation models as discussed in Greene (1990).
Informally, it accounts for the fact that the dependent variable in the regression model of an incidentally
truncated model is observed only for part of the sample used to estimate the probit model, not its whole
sample.
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FCS. FCS peaked in 1988 with 11 FCS branches originating OL guarantees and has
been decreasing or nearly flat every year since then.14
The number of FO guaranteed loan originating banks rose dramatically in 1987,
but did not peak until 1991 with 35 banks, or 14% of the total number of Arkansas
banks as shown in Table 5. These numbers have also been decreasing or relatively flat
from 1987 to 1995. The number of FCS branches making FO loans more closely mirrors the number of OL guarantees made by FCS branches than do bank originations of
FO and OL loans mirror one another. FCS peaked in 1989 with eight branches originating FO guaranteed loans and they have been decreasing or nearly flat every year
since then through 1995.
Table 6 presents the number of Arkansas banks experiencing loss claims by year
from 1984 to 1995. OL loss claims experienced a surge in 1988 with 11 banks reporting claims, and again in 1993 with 26 banks experiencing loss claims. Banks with FO
loan loss claims have been relatively few with a 1993 peak of five banks experiencing
loss claims. Figure 2 presents the volume of FSA loss claims paid out to financial
institutions by year by loan type for fiscal years 1989-1998.15 Loss claims increased
markedly in 1992 and 1993 and then decreased before rising again slightly in 1997.
General Relationships Among Participating and Non-Participating Banks
Table 7 gives a brief summarization of similarities and differences between banks
that made no FSA OL or FO loans in the sample years 1990 to 1995 and those that
did.16 It is interesting that fewer than half the banks in the state that could have made a
guaranteed loan used that option in the six-year period. Like Koenig and Sullivan (1991),
higher levels of assets, AGTL, and MBHC are associated with participating banks,
although the differences between participating and non-participating banks for MBHC
and ASSETS are not large. Banks in counties with more of their agricultural revenues
from field crops are more likely to participate. Loan-to-asset ratios and ROA do not
vary substantively between participants and non-participants.
Estimated OL and FO Obligation Submodels
Initially, the two obligation submodels hypothesized had 15 variables plus the IMR
ratio in the regression equations.17 Note that inclusion of the same variables in both the
selection and regression models suggests the possibility of estimating the model as a
Tobit specification. The fact that different variables are significant in a given pair of
selection and regression equations rejects this approach. In the first round estimation

14

Farm Credit Service data are observed at the branch level.
Only the latest 10 years of these data were requested. They were provided by Steve Ford of FSA. These
figures do not include payments such as Chapter 12 or voluntary lender write-downs which are generally
a small part of loss claims payments.
16
These banks exclude those banks in the state for which sufficient data could not be obtained to be included
in the sample for estimating the regression models.
17
The results for the OL and FO obligation submodels are slightly different than those in Dixon et al., 1997
due to revised computations of CVFARMV, ∆FMINC, CVFMINC and FCREV.
15
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that included all variables, the OL probit model had four variables with z’s less than
one in absolute value and the OL regression equation had seven such variables.18 In the
FO submodel six variables were removed from the probit equation in the first round
estimation and eleven of the independent variables had z’s less than one in absolute
value in the FO regression equation.19
After eliminating the low significance variables, the final models were estimated.
Table 8 displays the elasticities of statistically significant (α=.05) continuous variables
and statistically significant coefficients of binary variables as well as descriptive statistics of the models’ fit. The estimated models for the four equations in the obligation
submodels fit reasonably well. The probit models’ (OBL and OBF) classification powers are not highly impressive even though over 83% of the observations are classified
correctly. That is, of the sample observations, the two probit models classify at least
83% of the observations into their observed category correctly. This high rate is obtained because most banks did not use loan guarantees in a given year. Thus, by predicting no loan would be made for all observations, the probit models could achieve a
high rate of accuracy. Both of the final OL and FO probit models had eight variables
significant at the .05 level.
The two regression equations explaining volume (OLOBL and FOOBL) vary considerably in terms of R2. The OL volume equation has an R2 of 0.256, which is somewhat low for primarily cross-sectional data, but the FO volume equation has an R2 of
0.384, respectable for cross-sectional data. In the OL volume equation (OLOBL) model
there are five variables significant at the .05 level and four significant variables in the
FO volume (FOOBL) model.
To facilitate the discussion of the impacts of the statistically significant continuous
independent variables, their elasticities are presented in the top of Table 8. Using elasticities removes problems engendered by the differing units of the independent variables. The estimated coefficients for the binary variables that are significant at the .05
level are presented in the lower part of Table 8.20 Elasticities have no empirical meaning for binary variables so their estimated coefficients are presented. In the probit models, the binary variable coefficient estimates are the number of standard deviations the
mean of the probit function increases when the binary goes from 0 to 1. A negative
coefficient would indicate a decrease in the mean of the probit function and thus a
decrease in the probability of the bank making a guaranteed loan. The binary coefficient estimates can be compared with each other. In the probit models, those estimates
larger in absolute value have more impact on the probability of using loan guarantees
than those variables with smaller coefficients in absolute value.
In the OL probit model the four excluded variables were ∆FMINC, CVFARMV, ROA, and MSA. In the
OL volume regression model the eliminated variables were RISK, HHI, ∆FMINC, MS, ROA, PREF, and
the IMR.
19
In the FO probit model the six excluded variables were RISK, HHI, ∆FMINC, CVFARMV, ROA, and
MSA. In the FO volume regression model the variables ASSET, LAR, AGTL, MS, FCREV, ∆FMINC,
CVFARMV, CVFMINC, ROA, PREF, and IMR were excluded.
20
These are direct elasticities. Total regression equation elasticities of variables that appear in both selection
and regression equations in a given submodel include the effect of changes in the IMR (see Greene, 1990).
However, the IMR was eliminated in the first round of the estimation of all three of the submodels.
18
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Both probit models (OBL and OBF) have more significant variables than their
counterpart volume equations (OLOBL and FOOBL). The variables LAR, AGTL, HHI
and PREF, and CVFMINC in the OBL probit model have coefficients with expected
signs. The signs of LAR, AGTL, HHI, and CVFMINC indicate loan guarantees are
viewed as risk reducing activities. The positive PREF coefficient means preferred banks
are more likely to use the loan programs. This is not surprising and the fact that the
PREF coefficient (1.08) exceeds one implies a large effect. The positive sign on the
MS coefficient is counter-intuitive. It suggests that as competitiveness of loan markets
declines (MS increases), banks are more inclined to use guarantees, perhaps because of
pursuing marginal borrowers. But this is offset by HHI having a negative elasticity
which means loan guarantees increase in less concentrated deposit markets. The positive sign on FCREV reflects that counties whose primary agriculture is crops have by
far the largest share of OL guarantees both in numbers and dollar volume. Relative
riskiness of agricultural loans to loans in general is estimated to be negatively related to
making guaranteed operating loans. This suggests that added risk in the agricultural
sector does not lead to using more loan guarantees. Compared with the other variables,
the elasticity of RISK is small.
In the OLOBL volume equation in Table 8, percentage changes in AGTL, FCREV,
and CVFMINC are at least three times as important as the impact of ASSET, the only
other significant independent variable. Thus, banks emphasizing agricultural loans and
located in rural field crop counties with relatively variable farm income are likely to
make the largest level of obligations given that they make guaranteed operating loans.
This does not imply that each obligation to a given borrower is larger, just that the bank
makes a larger volume of obligations. ASSET is significant but very inelastic, indicative that larger banks are inclined to have a larger volume given they make guaranteed
loans. However, the changes in obligation volume are small for proportionate changes
in ASSET.
In the FO probit model (OBF) in Table 8 there are seven significant continuous
variables and three of them have elasticities in excess of one in absolute value. These
are LAR, FCREV, and INT. Recall that FO guarantees are not concentrated in the
eastern portions of the state as are OL loans. Thus it is not surprising to see the negative
sign on FCREV, indicating some concentration of FO guaranteed loans in counties
with lower intensity in field crops. LAR, CVFMINC, and INT have the anticipated
(positive) signs indicating risk reduction by the banks. This is similarly reflected by the
significance and positive sign on AGTL indicating the desire by banks to offset lack of
diversification. The positive sign on MS, contrary to hypothesis, is surprising but can
be justified for the same reasons as for its positive sign in the OL probit model, that is,
these banks may be pursuing marginal borrowers. Being a preferred lender (PREF = 1)
increases use as would be expected.
In the FO volume equation (FOOBL) only three continuous variables are significant. The variables INT and HHI certainly have the largest elasticities (-1.44 and
-0.789, respectively) among these three variables. The negative sign on INT is surprising, particularly given the positive sign on INT in the FO probit equation. What the
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negative sign may reflect is that as real interest rates rise, farm operators are inclined to
borrow less. The significance of HHI indicates that as market competitiveness decreases,
banks have less need to seek guarantees. Contrary to the sign of RISK in the OL probit
model, greater riskiness of agricultural loans to other loans in the FO volume equation
leads to increased volume of guarantees. Such behavior is probably to be expected
since FO loans are potentially for longer periods than OL loans.
Only one binary variable, MSA, is significant in the FO volume equation. As we
would expect, location of a bank in urban areas is likely to lead the bank to have a
lower guaranteed loan volume. This is also the case with the OL loans.
Estimated OL Loss Claims Model
In the loss claims submodel the first round of estimation resulted in only six of the
initial 14 regressors in the probit model having z statistics equal to or greater than one
in absolute value21. Similarly, there are six independent variables in the loss claims
regression model with z statistics equal to or greater than one in absolute value.
In the second round estimation, only variables with z statistics greater than or
equal to one in absolute value were included in the models. In the probit model (LS) the
four variables FCREV, lagged interest rates, FSAGOL, and OLLAG are statistically
significant at the .05 level (Table 8). The estimated model predicts 86% of the observations correctly and the regression model has relatively good explanatory power with a
coefficient of determination equal to 0.276. Interestingly, none of the binary variables
in either model are statistically significant.
The probit model has three variables with the expected signs. As we would expect,
FSAGOL, the estimated volume of outstanding obligations is positive as well as the
past volume of agricultural loan losses, OLLAG. The significance of this latter variable is surprising because it suggests that some banks are consistently making loans
that are subsequently defaulted. We cannot state that these banks make more bad loans
on average than other banks because, in terms of profitability, we would expect that
banks are going to have some loans defaulted. Moreover, it may be a positive indication because these banks insure more loans that are likely to go bad and, therefore, the
bank’s use of loan guarantees is justified and a profitable move. Finally, the positive
sign on FCREV simply indicates that the more row crop oriented a county is, the more
likely it is to have loss claims. This is to be expected since our previous results show
that banks in counties with higher FCREV are more likely to make OL loans. The
variable FSAGOL also picks up this effect.
The negative sign on lagged interest rates is surprising. Our prior reasoning argued
that increasing interest rates should lead to more defaults. The opposite result might
reflect a rise in interest rates causing banks to be more selective in lending, even with
loan guarantees. Recall that the loss claims model is only for operating loans and inter21

In the probit model the eight excluded variables are AGTL, HHI, MS, CVFARMV, CVFMINC, ∆FMINC,
RISK, and PREF. In the regression model the eight excluded variables are HHI, MS, CVFARMV,
CVFMINC, FCREV, RISK, lagged INT, and OLLAG.
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est rates do not lead to more banks using loan guarantees for OL loans (OBL equation).22 Even with the explanation of greater selectivity of borrowers, the negative sign
deserves further investigation, perhaps with a longer time series.
In the volume of loss claims paid regression (LOSS), the signs of the elasticities
are as anticipated for ∆FMINC and FSAGOL. As farm income increases, we would
expect loss claims to go down and the negative sign on ∆FMINC reflects this. The
positive sign on FSAGOL simply reflects that banks with larger exposures are going to
make a greater volume of loss claims.
The sign on AGEOL is surprisingly positive. This most likely reflects that most
loans were intended to be paid back within a year and were delayed as the borrower
tried to find a means of paying back the loan. This may also represent banks willingness to work with a stressed borrower for a year before foreclosing on a loan. It could
also imply stronger borrowers pay loans off sooner. Moreover, the result may mean
that for OL loans with terms exceeding one year, it takes time for those loans to go bad.
CONCLUSIONS
Since 1985, the FSA guaranteed loan program has increased in importance and has
become the main vehicle for FSA to finance production agriculture. The goal of the
guaranteed loan program is to motivate private sector lenders to become more active in
lending to marginal agricultural borrowers. The limits on the loans, $400,000 for operating loans and $300,000 for farm ownerships loans, imply these loans are not targeted
at large farm operations.
Because the motivation for the program is to get the government out of lending for
budgetary reasons and to get the private sector more involved, this study sought to find
out what factors motivated commercial banks in Arkansas to use loan guarantees. The
data show that over the six fiscal years from 1990 to 1995, fewer than half the banks in
Arkansas made use of even one loan guarantee. Thus, it is important to know what
factors are motivating use of FSA guaranteed loans, particularly since the structure of
commercial banking is changing rapidly.
The data reveal that guarantees of operating loans are more frequent than farm
ownership loans in Arkansas although this may be because of lower farm ownership
obligation volumes appropriated by the federal government. Operating loans are more
frequent in the Arkansas Delta which is a region dominated by field crops as opposed
to the remainder of the state which has a more diverse agriculture. Given the higher
number of operating loan guarantees, the dollar volume of operating loan guarantees
surpasses that of farm ownership loans. However, the operating loan volume in Arkansas has remained fairly level over 1987 to 1997, except for a surge in 1996, whereas the
farm ownership guaranteed volume has generally increased over time. Loss claims
have had a decided cyclical behavior with a peak in fiscal years 1992 and 1993.
The statistical models indicate commercial banks use guaranteed loans with the
goal of making risky loans more secure. Ceteris paribus, banks with higher agricultural
loan to total loan ratios tended to use guaranteed loans more frequently. Rising interest
22
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rates motivated banks to use guarantees on farm ownership loans but interest rates
were not significant in the decision to make guaranteed operating loans. There are
some economies of size effects associated with bank size in making guaranteed loans.
As we would expect, the impact of certified or approved lender status is associated
with a greater likelihood of a bank using guaranteed loans. However, having this preferred status does not lead to a bank necessarily having a greater volume of loans since
the variable indicating preferred status was not significant in the volume equations for
either operating or farm ownership loans. Banks in rural counties tended to make a
higher volume of guaranteed obligations.
Not surprisingly, loss claims are associated with banks having larger exposures to
guaranteed loans. Moreover, prior loss claims by a bank are positively associated with
a bank making current loss claims. This does not indicate that a bank is consistently
making bad loans, but it may suggest that the bank uses guaranteed loans very much to
its benefit. Perhaps the more policy relevant aspect of loss claims is whether volumes
of payments are too high and whether criteria for making loans should be strengthened
to cut government losses. This is an issue deserving of further investigation.
Variables reflecting general economic conditions in the agricultural sector had some
significant effects as independent variables. In particular, interest rates and the variability of farm income appeared in several estimated equations. Interest rates clearly
have major impacts in making farm ownership loans. As interest rates rise, the costs of
paying back are higher and the likelihood of defaulting becomes greater. Thus, as has
been shown in the past, the agricultural sector is tied to what is happening in the economy
at large. Moreover, if the FAIR Act leads to greater volatility of farm income, the
significance of the variability of farm income will be even more important and lead to
an increased demand for guaranteed loans. Farm income decreased decisively in 1998.
Congress and the Administration reacted by broadening provisions for using the guaranteed loan program. Thus, with greater farm income volatility and increased accessibility to guaranteed loans, we can expect more use of guaranteed loans.
Bank mergers are occurring and are likely to continue. However, it appears that
this trend will not necessarily lead to fewer guaranteed loans being made. Membership
in a multi-bank holding company did not significantly affect guarantee use. Thus more
merger activity will not necessarily lead to less use of guaranteed loans. Also, rural
Arkansas agricultural banks find guaranteed loans attractive.
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Table 1. Arkansas FSA Guaranteed Loan Obligations Originated and
Number of Originations, 1981-1998*
Year

FO ($)

FO (#)

OL ($)

OL (#)

1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998

78,930
121,500
174,000
251,300
1,677,500
5,023,380
9,824,510
12,760,040
11,927,800
15,961,300
17,084,430
15,224,320
13,089,280
17,174,050
20,550,680
28,239,120
33,474,380
24,080,170

2
1
2
3
11
30
59
76
69
88
87
89
61
83
103
132
153
103

299,250
586,800
1,943,940
1,681,880
14,029,900
15,442,830
34,339,150
37,562,150
34,540,440
31,612,490
37,247,620
29,338,250
20,963,100
28,961,120
31,499,400
46,920,210
27,364,820
30,206,730

4
6
14
13
82
133
328
359
322
284
323
245
160
218
274
324
233
227

Total ($) Total (#)
378,180
708,300
2,117,940
1,933,180
15,707,400
20,466,210
44,163,660
50,322,190
46,468,240
47,573,790
54,332,050
44,562,570
34,052,380
46,135,170
52,050,080
75,159,330
60,839,200
54,286,900

6
7
16
16
93
163
387
435
391
372
410
334
221
301
377
456
386
330

Source: FSA Form 389-175.
* FO = Farm Ownership, and OL = operating loan.

27

28

22
28
467
44
30
564
29
43
197

1,063,840
1,872,671
61,674,000
3,618,678
2,303,350
83,912,592
1,661,940
2,685,900
23,404,918

48,356
66,881
132,064
82,243
76,778
148,781
57,308
62,463
118,807

Source: Computed from FSA Arkansas State Office data.

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

CRD

Operating Loan Guarantees
Average
Number
Volume ($)
obligation ($)
0.58
1.03
33.85
1.99
1.26
46.06
0.91
1.47
12.85

Percent of Ark.
OL obligations
43
70
47
98
18
140
34
52
19

6,043,661
16,542,790
10,411,716
18,909,363
3,287,735
24,509,351
2,734,578
11,740,520
1,659,942

140,550
236,326
221,526
192,953
182,652
175,067
80,429
225,779
87,365

Farm Ownership Loan Guarantees
Average
Number Volume ($)
obligation ($)

Table 2. Arkansas FSA Guaranteed Loan Obligations by Crop Reporting District (CRD): 1990-1995

6.31
17.26
10.86
19.73
3.43
25.57
2.85
12.25
1.73

Percent of Ark.
FO obligation
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Table 3. Definitions of All Dependent and Independent Variables a.b
NAME

DEFINITION

Dependent Variables
OBL

OBL = 1 if a bank obligates one or more guaranteed operating loans in year t,
0 otherwise

OLOBL

Volume of FSA guaranteed operating loan obligations a bank originated in year t
(thousands of dollars)

OBF

OBF = 1 if a bank obligates one or more guaranteed farm ownership loans in year
t, 0 otherwise

FOOBL

Volume of FSA guaranteed farm ownership loan obligations a bank originated in
year t (thousands of dollars)

LS

LS = 1 if a bank has an FSA loss claim in year t, 0 otherwise

LOSS

Volume of FSA guaranteed loan loss claims paid to a bank in a given year
(thousands of dollars)

Independent Variables
ROA

Ratio of return to assets

LAR

Ratio of outstanding loans to total assets per bank by year

MSA

MSA = 1 if bank is located in a metropolitan statistical area, 0 otherwise

MS

Proportion of total deposits held by a bank in its market area

AGTL

Ratio of outstanding agricultural loans to total loans per bank
continued
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Table 3. Continued.
NAME

DEFINITION

RISK

Ratio of volume of agricultural loan losses to total agricultural loans divided by
the ratio of total loan losses to total loans per bank

MBHC

MBHC = 1 if bank is member of a multi-bank holding company, 0 otherwise

ASSET

Size of bank in total assets (thousands of dollars)

PREF

PREF = 1 if bank is an FSA approved lender (ALP or CLP), 0 otherwise

INT

Discount rate plus 475 basis points divided by 100, less the inflation rate

FSAGOL

Estimated volume of outstanding FSA guaranteed OL loan obligations per bankc
(thousands of dollars)

AGEOL

Estimated average age of a bank’s volume of outstanding FSA or guaranteed
loan obligations thousands of dollars

OLLAG

Sum of the volume of FSA guaranteed operating loan loss claims paid to a bank
over the previous five years (thousands of dollars)

IMR

Inverse Mills Ratio

HHI

Concentration of deposits in bank’s market area (Herfindahl–Herschmann Index)

CVFARMV

Coefficient of variation in value of farmland and buildings for the previous four years
for the county in which bank is located

∆FMINC

Proportional change in farm income from one year to the next in bank’s county

CVFMINC

Coefficient of variation in net farm income for the previous four years for the county
in which a bank is located

FCREV

Ratio of revenues from the sale of field crops to total agricultural revenues per
county

a

The subscripts “it” are suppressed for clarity but each variable is defined for bank i and year t
except for interest rates which are lagged one year in the loss claims model.
b
For those variables that require further transformation from the raw data set, more computational
detail is provided in McCollum (1996).
c
Because of FSA’s data storage method, it was not possible to determine the actual balances for
a given point in the past. The criterion for computing a bank’s outstanding FSA loan guarantees
was based on the empirical observation that operating loans are usually paid back within a year
as discussed in a previous section.
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Table 4. Arkansas Institutions Originating FSA Guaranteed Operating Loans
Year

Number of banks

Percent of banks in state

1985
38
14%
1986
40
15%
1987
77
29%
1988
75
28%
1989
68
26%
1990
69
27%
1991
70
28%
1992
58
23%
1993
52
20%
1994
58
23%
1995
57
23%
Source: Computed from FSA Arkansas State Office data.

Number of FCS branches
2
3
9
11
9
6
5
6
4
4
5

Table 5. Arkansas Institutions Originating FSA Guaranteed Farm Ownership Loans.
Year

Number of banks

Percent of banks in state

1985
16
6%
1986
18
7%
1987
27
10%
1988
31
12%
1989
30
11%
1990
32
12%
1991
35
14%
1992
25
10%
1993
20
8%
1994
24
10%
1995
28
12%
Source: Computed from FSA Arkansas State Office data.

Number of FCS branches
1
2
5
7
8
5
3
3
2
4
4

Table 6. Number of Arkansas Banks Experiencing Loss Claims
Year

Operating loan loss claims

1984
2
1985
5
1986
6
1987
7
1988
11
1989
6
1990
8
1991
10
1992
20
1993
26
1994
17
1995
10
Source: Computed from FSA Arkansas State Office data.

Farm ownership loss claims
0
1
0
1
1
3
0
2
4
5
4
2
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Table 7. Comparison of characteristics between participating and
non-participating banks in regression samplea.

Banks (number)
Mean bank assets (ASSETS)
(thousands of dollars)

Participating

Non-participating

108

135

72,544

63,754
Mean percentb

Return on assets (ROA)
Agricultural loan to total loan ratio (AGTL)
Loan to asset ratio (LAR)
Member multi-bank holding co. (MBHC)
Agricultural revenues from field crops (FCREV)
a

1.15
23.7
51.5
38.8
52.1

1.15
11.1
50.0
34.2
30.2

A participating bank is a bank that made at least one FSA guaranteed loan during 1990-1995.
Otherwise a bank is designated as a non-participant.
b
Averages are over the annual observations.
Source: Computed.
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Table 8. Estimated elasticities of significant continuous variables, coefficient estimates of
significant binary variables, in the three submodels, and goodness of fit statisticsa .
Submodel
Dependent variableb

OL
OBL

OLOBL

OBF

0.113

0.162
1.765
0.912

FO
FOOBL

OL loss claim
LS
Loss

Independent variables b
Continuous
ASSET
LAR
AGTL
RISK
MS
HHI
FCREV
CVFMINC
∆FMINC
INTc
FSAGOL
OLLAG
AGEOL
Binary variablesb
PREF
MSA
SAMPLE SIZE
R2
% Correct predictionsd

0.693
0.576
-0.145
0.558
-.645
0.331
0.424

0.447

0.211
0.398
-0.789
0.568
.454

-1.149
0.429

.914
-0.079

1.450

-1.44

-2.74
0.533
0.137

.598
.890

1.08
1423
83

.864
-206
308
0.256

1423
90

-416
138
.384

388

69
0.276

86

a

Elasticities and binary variable estimates are reported only for those variables significant at the
0.05 level. All variables are current fiscal year except RISK, FCREV, ∆FMINC, FSAG, and OLLAG.
RISK, FCREF, and ∆FMINC are all lagged one year and FSAGOL and OLLAG are distributed
lags over three and five years, respectively.
b
Variable definitions are provided in Table 3.
c
For the LS and LOSS models the variable INT is lagged one period.
d
Percent of observations in the sample correctly classified by the probit model.
Source: Computed.
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Source: FSA Form 389-175

Fig. 1. Arkansas FSA guaranteed loan obligations: 1981 to 1998.
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Source: Steve Ford, FSA, Washington D.C. office
*Totals reported are not inclusive because they do not include all loss claim payments such as payments for Chapter 12 or voluntary write-downs.

Fig. 2. Arkansas FSA loss claims on guaranteed loans: 1989 to 1998*
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APPENDIX A: Counties and crop-reporting districts of Arkansas.

1

2

3

4
5

6

7
8
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